This book brings together people's intuitions, philosophical theories, and principles of Jewish ethics to suggest where our values should lead us. The author argues that a moral freedom of respect upholds freedom of the Self and respect for the Other.

This book explains why we should stop thinking of freedom as limited to a right to be left alone, and explores how Kantian philosophy and Jewish thought instead give rise to a concept of positive freedom. At heart, positive freedom must be understood as inextricably linked to the obligation to respect the autonomy and dignity of others.

This book brings together people’s intuitions, philosophical theories, and principles of Jewish ethics to suggest where our values should lead us. The author argues that a moral freedom of respect upholds freedom of the Self and respect for the Other.

Women’s voices are widely expressed in current movements of rejuvenation of Jewish traditions. These moves raise tensions within the religious world and the civil legal realm. In focus here is a much-debated instance: the nearly thirty-year effort by Jewish women to pray in a group in song and read from the Bible at the holy site of the Western Wall in Jerusalem. The group is called the Women of the Wall (WoW). In addition to the women's rights of speech, discussion (...) here highlights the need to recognize duties of respect for the women’s voices. Moral analysis of the Jewish and democratic values which constitutionally define Israel founds the legal basis for this duty of respect. Both Jewish thought and Kantian analysis are seen to conceptualize the essence of freedom as obligation, from which arise duties of respect for the other. Duties of respect indeed are owed to WoW by the other worshippers at the Western Wall, as well as by the rabbinic authorities in control of forms of prayer at the site. That both Jewish and democratic values deem obligation as the essence of freedom lends support to seeing coherence between the two sets of values defining the State of Israel. (shrink)

Paradigm debates have been featured in the nursing literature for over four decades. There are at least two opposing paradigms specific to nursing that have remained central in these debates. Advocates of the unitary perspective (or simultaneity paradigm) consider their theories to be more philosophically advanced and contemporary alternatives when compared to the older more traditional ideas characteristic of models they describe as originating from the totality paradigm. In the context of these debates, I focus on some theoretical positions embedded (...) in the unitary perspective, noting their limitations with respect to integrating the individual and social mandates of nursing; nurses are responsible not only for individual health‐related needs, but also for the health of the collective. I explore two hypotheses that may explain the powers of endurance of the unitary perspective. Paley, who outlines the origins of nurses' ‘slave morality’, inspires the first hypothesis. The second hypothesis speaks to the location of nursing knowledge development in the context of liberal ideology. In this work, I outline key conceptualizations of the unitary perspective in order to clearly illustrate the limitations of the unitary perspective for nurses' social mandate. Then, I explore how slave morality and liberal ideological assumptions might both work to sustain the unitary perspective. A paradigm for nursing must have utility in addressing both the health‐related needs of individuals, and for addressing the health of the collective. To this end, I advance suggestions in three areas: first, to transform nurses' slave morality to more honest and noble aspirations; second, to examine liberal ideological premises; and third, to end paradigm debate by resituating elements of the unitary perspective to the level of mid‐range theory, where it could be most effective for research and practice with specific populations. (shrink)

a single life-span. Philosophers, then, do not see more or know more, and they do not see less or know less. They aim to see less detail and more of the abstract. Their details, if you like, are abstractions. Walking on God’s earth as a pedestrian, as a farmer working his fields or as a passer-by, one’s picture of one’s surroundings is every bit as intelligent as that of the pilot riding the sky. The views of the field are radically (...) different, however. One sees only a specific field and in all lively detail: the exact pattern of the land, or even the exact outline of a given leaf, grasshopper, grain of sand even. Acquaintance with minute detail is not without its price: details may stand in the way of conjuring the big picture. It may be difficult to compare whichever field one happens to be in with far off fields, with respect to their size or shape or any other quality. One may wish to inquire if far off fields were already planted, harvested, or even if they exist. A pedestrian may find it hard or even impossible to do so. The pedestrian view contains fine points that the pilot’s map never would, but it does not necessarily contain more information, for it lacks the general context. After all, there are only so many items that one can observe and account for at a single glance, a single map, a single book, a single life-span. (shrink)

Quine’s philosophy comprises a bewildering set of views whose integrating principle is his "confirmed extensionalism". The paper offers a historical as well as an intellectual reconstruction of extensionalism. Traditional extensionalism (Boole) freed logic from Aristotelian essentialism that had inhibited the development of logic. Quine’s confirmed extensionalism is the acceptance, as a matter of course, of the validity of Frege’s criticism of [Boole’s] extensionalism. His confirmed extensionalism is a generalized version of the philosophy of science known as conventionalism. As such, it (...) places the advancement of science outside the province of science proper. It is, thus, at odds with Quine’s repeated expressions of alliance with the Popperian (hypothetico-deductive) model of science. (shrink)

The central thesis of Karl Popper's philosophy is that intellectual and political progress are best achieved by not deferring to dogmatic authority. His philosophy of science is a plea for the replacement of classic dogmatic methodology with critical debate. His philosophy of politics, similarly, is a plea for replacing Utopian social and political engineering with a more fallibilist, piecemeal variety. Many confuse his anti‐dogmatism with relativism, and his anti‐authoritarianism with Cold War conservatism or even with libertarian politics. Not so: he (...) showed a clear preference for the ideal of truth over relativist complacency, for cosmopolitanism over nationalism, and for democratic control over unbridled capitalism. (shrink)

In his last book, Agassi reiterates Critical Rationalism as a full-fledged philosophy of life. He criticizes Paternalism and Relativism as degenerative, and even pathological, attempts to grant life a meaning, and suggests, in their place, that fallibilism is the minimal condition for a meaningful life.

This book is a philosophical introduction to the field of communication and media studies. In search of the philosophical backgrounds of that relatively young field, the book explores why this overwhelmingly popular discipline is in crisis. The book discusses classic introductions on communication, provides an update on lessons learned, and re-evaluates the work of pioneers in the light of up-to-date philosophical standards. It summarizes various debates surrounding the foundations of system theory and especially its applicability to the Social Sciences in (...) general and to Communication Studies in particular. Communication schools promise their students an understanding of the source of a principal and dynamical power in their lives, a power shaping societies and identities, molding aspirations, and deciding their fates. They also promise students a practical benefit, a chance to learn the secret of controlling that dynamical power, improving a set of skills that would ensure them a critical edge in the future job market: become better media experts for all media. Yet no one seems to know how such promises are met. Can there be a general theory of communication? If not, what can (should) communication students learn? This book looks at the problem from a philosophical perspective and proposes a framework wherein critical cases can be tested. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ahead of Print.

In this paper I offer a brief summary of Popper’s views on metaphysics. I then explain Agassi’s criticism of those views, and why I regard them as fruitful improvements.

Classical thinking on rationality regards it as an all-or-nothing affair. It thus fails to account for the fact that institutions are powerful social factors that frame the contexts within which rational agents supposedly exercise their ability to choose. This poses the classic dilemma: should social explanation refer to individual decisions or to institutions? Wettersten skillfully criticizes some of the most advanced solutions to it, and attempts to formulate a better explanatory unit for the social sciences: the partially rational individual. Since (...) the partially rational individual is also only partially an individual,Wettersten's methodological reconciliation between individualism and holism seems to have some ontological implications too, ones that he seems reluctant to embrace. His book is nevertheless an interesting contribution to the controversy regarding the limits to the explanatory power of social theories. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a brief summary of Popper’s views on metaphysics. I then explain Agassi’s criticism of those views, and why I regard them as fruitful improvements.

Logic, Rhetoric and Argumentation Theory are more or less distinct attempts to approach the riddle of persuasion: what makes our reason tick? Moreover, how best can we study our ability to influence the reason of others so as to make them share our opinions? The three classical answers, then, are: (1) Logic, the theory of valid inference, is the best persuasion theory available. (2) Rhetoric, the theory of effective manipulation of others is the best persuasion theory available. Finally, (3) Argumentation (...) theory, the middle theory that recommends a mix of reasoning and manipulation, is the best persuasion theory available. In this article, I briefly explain the controversy between these three competing views and offer some comments upon its possible resolution. Since all forms of communication are performed on the spectrum between manipulation and the non-manipulative offering of contents, this controversy should interest all those who are intrigued by the miraculous possibility of human communication in the first place. (shrink)

Most of our colleagues are either dogmatists or justificationists. This makes friendship with them a delicate matter: one constantly faces the dilemma of either doing them the curtesy of overlooking their faults, or offering them the service of readiness to criticize their opinions. Bunge is one of the few who make both friendship and criticism easy: he avoids both dogmas and justifications.

Quine’s philosophy comprises a bewildering set of views whose integrating principle is his “confirmed extensionalism”. The paper offers a historical as well as an intellectual reconstruction of extensionalism. Traditional extensionalism freed logic from Aristotelian essentialism that had inhibited the development of logic. Quine’s confirmed extensionalism is the acceptance, as a matter of course, of the validity of Frege’s criticism of [Boole’s] extensionalism. His confirmed extensionalism is a generalized version of the philosophy of science known as conventionalism. As such, it places (...) the advancement of science outside the province of science proper. It is, thus, at odds with Quine’s repeated expressions of alliance with the Popperian model of science. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Ahead of Print.

This volume features forty-two essays written in honor of Joseph Agassi. It explores the work and legacy of this influential philosopher, an exciting and challenging advocate of critical rationalism. Throughout six decades of stupendous intellectual activity, Agassi called attention to rationality as the very starting point of every notable philosophical way of life. The essays present Agassi’s own views on critical rationalism. They also develop and expand upon his work in new and provocative ways. The authors include Agassi's most notable (...) pupils, friends, and colleagues. Overall, their contributions challenge the received view on a variety of issues concerning science, religion, and education. Readers will find well-reasoned arguments on such topics as the secular problem of evil, religion and critical thinking, liberal democratic educational communities, democracy and constitutionalism, and capitalism at a crossroad.“/div>divTo Joseph Agassi, philosophy is the practice of reason, where reason is understood as the relentless search for criticisms of the best available explanations that we have to the world around us. This book not only honors one of the most original philosophers of science today. It also offers readers insights into a school of thought that lies at the heart of philosophy. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and political (...) philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

Since its inception in 2010, the Network for Public Health Law has aligned with federal, state, tribal, and local public health practitioners to assess how law can promote and protect the public’s health. In 2013, Network authors illustrated major trends in public health laws and policies emanating from an internal assessment of thousands of requests for technical assistance nationally. More recently, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has invited the Network and other partners to consider new ideas and strategies toward building (...) a “culture of health.” Per Figure 1, RWJF’s conception of a culture of health emphasizes key action areas essential to the promotion of health across all sectors and diverse populations. (shrink)

In this article we explain the specific contribution of Bar exams to the professional socialisation of Brazilian lawyer leaders through examining their changing content, particularly the coverage o...

“He's [the Red King's] dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he's dreaming about?”Alice said, “Nobody can guess that.”“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. “And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?”“Where I am now, of course,” said Alice.“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You'd be nowhere. Why, you're only a sort of thing in his dream!”“If that there King was to wake,” added Tweedledum, “you'd go out—bang!—just like a candle.”“I (...) shouldn't!” Alice exclaimed indignantly. “Besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?”“Ditto,” said Tweedledum.“Ditto, ditto!” cried Tweedledee.He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help saying “Hush! You'll be waking him, I'm afraid, if you make so much noise.”“Well, it's no use your talking about waking him,” said Tweedledum, “when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real.”“I am real!” said Alice, and began to cry.“You won't make yourself a bit realler by crying,” Tweedledee remarked: “there's nothing to cry about.”“If I wasn't real,” Alice said—half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous —“I shouldn't be able to cry.”“I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?” Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt.—Through the Looking Glass. (shrink)

What force has the Argument from Design—the attempt to argue to Design, and hence to God, from various alleged signs of it in Nature? Some preliminary points. First: To establish the reality of God need not be to prove that there exists an actual person meriting that name. Many theologians, for example P. Tillich, have denied that God is any manner of existent. On a fairly simple and attractive interpretation, their view is that ‘God’ names the principle that ethical requirements (...) are creatively powerful. In previous papers I tried to make sense of this principle: there is much that can be said for it. So when talking of ‘design’ I am not presupposing anything as specific as an actual designer. (shrink)

There are several forms of the Ontological Argument, but it is more or less fair to say that all hang on the contention that the notion of a perfect being entails the existence of that being, since existence is involved in perfection. My first interest is in the word "perfect." The word, I think, is usually vague but it seems to me that, in the context of the proof, it has a meaning which turns out to be much more pedestrian (...) than we would suspect. The argument, if it is valid, must assert that any perfect being would have to have every possible characteristic. It alleges that existence is a characteristic and it is, of course, over this that most debate has centered. It seems clear, however, that "perfect," as employed in the argument, merely means what we would call "complete" in less august transactions. In some forms of the proof, indeed, this is made somewhat clearer since the expression "greatest possible" being is substituted for "perfect." Ordinarily, no one would be tempted to pass lightly from the notion of "that which is complete" to the notion of "the deity." Both "perfect" and "greatest possible" appear to have moral connotations and "complete" usually does not. The slide, however, is made easier by the recurrent notion that evil is not a positive quality but merely the absence of another positive quality, usually goodness. If this view is held, it certainly does follow that whatever is "complete" must be "perfect" in the moral sense as well as in the other usual senses. It is not, here, my concern to pass judgment on this notion. I am, at the moment, merely trying to trace possible sources of confusion in the argument. (shrink)

The standard view of the function of reason is that it emerged to enable individuals to make better judgements and choices. Once individuals could think better, and once we had suitable communicative tools, individual reasoning acquired a public face; we reasoned together as well as privately, in our own mind. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber argue that this gets the story the wrong way around: reasoning evolved for public purposes: to persuade, negotiate, assess. Once it was established publically, perhaps it (...) acquired a private function too. With the exception of a few minor complaints, this evolutionary case is well made. However, Mercier and Sperber embed their evolutionary case within a modular view of the mind and suggest a modular view of public reasoning itself. While I find the evolutionary case persuasive, I am sceptical of the cognitive science framework. (shrink)

In seinen Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik aus den 1820er Jahren stellt Hegel die berühmte These auf, dass Kunst als eine Form des Absoluten ihr finales und fortgeschrittenstes Stadium in der Selbstauflösung der Romantik erreicht habe. Anschließend an Hegel schlägt der Kunstkritiker und Philosoph Arthur C. Danto am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts in einer Reihe von Aufsätzen vor, dass die Konzeptkunst seiner Zeit mit der These vom Ende der Kunst übereinstimmt. Kunst ist demnach abhängig von Theorie und nicht mehr von historischer (...) Relevanz. Um über die Bedeutung von Hegels These für uns heute nachzudenken, benutzt der vorliegende Essay das notorische Video, das der sogenannte Islamische Staat (ISIS) 2015 produziert hat. Es zeigt, wie diese militante Gruppe gewaltsam jahrhundertealte Skulpturen im Museum von Mosul zerstört. Obwohl weder die im Video gezeigten Skulpturen noch das Video selbst von uns als Kunstwerke angesehen werden, wurden diese Werke in der Vergangenheit als Kunst entworfen, und paradoxerweise überleben sie nur als Videoaufnahme ihre materielle Zerstörung, sodass sie für uns als Erscheinung gegenwärtig bleiben. Einerseits bestätigt der Inhalt des Videos Hegels Behauptung, dass die Kunst »für uns ein Vergangenes ist«; andererseits verweist es auf eine neue Form des Ausdrucks jenseits der These vom Ende der Kunst. (shrink)

As I am sitting at my desk in front of my computer, a thought crosses my mind: There's water in the glass. The thought has a particular content: that there is water in the glass. And, if all is well, there is water in the glass, so my thought is true. According to external-world skepticism, I still do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling what's in front of me does not allow me (...) to rule out the possibility that I’m only under some kind of illusion about what's in front of me. Analogously, according to content skepticism, I cannot know that I am thinking that there is water in my glass, even if in fact that is what I am thinking. This is because for all I know, my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under some kind of illusion about what I am thinking. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer ärztliche Umgang mit Opiaten und Sedativa bei Patienten am Lebensende kann ethische Fragen aufwerfen. Entsprechende Entscheidungen blieben bisher in aller Regel der ärztlichen Berufskunst und -pflicht überantwortet. Heute aber gerät dieser Bereich zunehmend auch in den Blickwinkel des Rechts. Ausdruck davon sind Bestrebungen, die indirekte Sterbehilfe, allenfalls auch die terminale Sedierung gesetzlich zu regeln. Ausgehend von einer Ist-Analyse der ärztlichen Praxis sowie von bereits bestehenden Regulierungen untersucht diese Arbeit die Konsequenzen derartiger Bestrebungen. Es zeigt sich, dass der Versuch, die (...) Thematik der indirekten Sterbehilfe für sich allein, also unter Vermeidung einer Regelung der direkt aktiven Sterbehilfe, zu behandeln, zu großen Schwierigkeiten führen würde. Ernüchternd sind aber auch die Erfahrungen aus den Niederlanden, derartige Fragen im Rahmen eines umfassenden Sterbehilfegesetzes anzugehen. Insgesamt ist somit zu befürchten, dass der Versuch einer detaillierten gesetzlichen Regelung dieses Bereiches mehr neue Grauzonen und Unsicherheiten schafft, als er zu beseitigen vermag. (shrink)

Ordinarily, if a person produces a nonreflective, ‘unstudied’ self-attribution of a present mental state – an avowal – we do not presume that they have produced the avowal on some specific epistemic basis; and we do not expect them to know how they know the self-attribution to be true. This no-‘how’ character of basic self-knowledge is puzzling, given that we regard avowals as manifesting factual, and indeed privileged, knowledge. I am here interested in views that accommodate both the baseless, no-‘how’ (...) and the factual, privileged character of basic self-knowledge. I argue that leading constitutivist views, which embrace both, fail properly to meet the doxastic (as opposed to justificatory) requirement on basic self-knowledge, thereby failing to preserve its genuinely factual character. I then argue that an alternative, neo-expressivist approach is better placed to meet the doxastic requirement, as well as being at least as well-placed as constitutivist views to address the justificatory requirement on baseless self-knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.2 (2004) 7-19 [Access article in PDF] Evaluating a Performance - Ideal vs. Great Performance Gilead Bar-Elli Two Notions of Performance Music, as everybody knows, is a performing art. Not only are musical works performed, but they are also designed, by their very nature, to be performed. The notion of a performance of a musical composition is therefore part and parcel of our conception (...) of music. And yet the relationships between a composition and its performances give rise to many difficult problems, some of which will be touched on later. For the present I want to stress two more specific issues in which the significance of the notion of performance for music lies. The first is that a musical composition is constituted by concepts and properties intrinsically connected to performance. In fact, I believe that the very meaning of these concepts and properties is rooted in the ways they are manifested in performance. Hence, even if a certain composition has never and will never be performed, it is still constituted by concepts and properties whose meaning lies in the ways they should be manifested in performance.The second point is that since music is in fact a performing art, since weperform music, and listen to various performances of the same compositions, and conceive of them and evaluate them as music, notions of performance are an integral part of the conceptual repertoire in which we conceive of music. Hence questions pertaining to the nature of performance, and to the relationship between a composition and its performances are inescapable in any philosophical investigation of music. And around these general questions a host of others suggest themselves: What makes a particular performance (even if faulty) a performance of a particular work? Can there be different equally good performances of the same work? In what terms should performances be evaluated (and graded) and how? Can a composition be individuated apart from its performances and how?On many of these problems and the issues surrounding them, a distinction between two conceptions of performance seems helpful, and sometimes [End Page 7] necessary. On the one hand we may conceive of a performance as a musical entity in itself, independently of the composition whose performance it in fact is. A performance thus conceived can be aesthetically evaluated "on its own" so to speak, or in and of itself, with no regard to our having an independent access to the composition whose performance it is. Sometimes, to push it to an extreme, we may not even know that it is a performance of a particular composition, and may not care if it is. Let us call this the"autonomousconception of a performance."On the other hand we often think of a performance as being essentially a performance of a particular composition, and we thus conceive of it and evaluate it. Here knowing which composition the performance is a performance of is essential. It is arguable that on this conception we must also have (in principle at least) an independent access to the composition, by being able to read its score, for example.1 Being a performance of a particular composition is, on this view, part of the very nature and identity of the performance. There can yet be various different performances of the same composition, and they may be compared and evaluated as such. In light of this essential relationship between the performance and "its" composition (the work whose performance it is) let us call this the "intentionalisticconception of a performance."There is a great difference between these two conceptions, and they imply important differences for the nature of music and of musical composition. I am not committing myself here to any particular view of the ontic nature of a composition — whether it is a class of performances, or a kind (in Nicholas Wolterstorff's sense) or a design (in Roger Scruton's).2 I shall exemplify the pertinence of the above distinction for one case. Many people think that music resides only in performances (some would add, actual and possible... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.2 (2004) 7-19 [Access article in PDF] Evaluating a Performance - Ideal vs. Great Performance Gilead Bar-Elli Two Notions of Performance Music, as everybody knows, is a performing art. Not only are musical works performed, but they are also designed, by their very nature, to be performed. The notion of a performance of a musical composition is therefore part and parcel of our conception (...) of music. And yet the relationships between a composition and its performances give rise to many difficult problems, some of which will be touched on later. For the present I want to stress two more specific issues in which the significance of the notion of performance for music lies. The first is that a musical composition is constituted by concepts and properties intrinsically connected to performance. In fact, I believe that the very meaning of these concepts and properties is rooted in the ways they are manifested in performance. Hence, even if a certain composition has never and will never be performed, it is still constituted by concepts and properties whose meaning lies in the ways they should be manifested in performance.The second point is that since music is in fact a performing art, since weperform music, and listen to various performances of the same compositions, and conceive of them and evaluate them as music, notions of performance are an integral part of the conceptual repertoire in which we conceive of music. Hence questions pertaining to the nature of performance, and to the relationship between a composition and its performances are inescapable in any philosophical investigation of music. And around these general questions a host of others suggest themselves: What makes a particular performance (even if faulty) a performance of a particular work? Can there be different equally good performances of the same work? In what terms should performances be evaluated (and graded) and how? Can a composition be individuated apart from its performances and how?On many of these problems and the issues surrounding them, a distinction between two conceptions of performance seems helpful, and sometimes [End Page 7] necessary. On the one hand we may conceive of a performance as a musical entity in itself, independently of the composition whose performance it in fact is. A performance thus conceived can be aesthetically evaluated "on its own" so to speak, or in and of itself, with no regard to our having an independent access to the composition whose performance it is. Sometimes, to push it to an extreme, we may not even know that it is a performance of a particular composition, and may not care if it is. Let us call this the"autonomousconception of a performance."On the other hand we often think of a performance as being essentially a performance of a particular composition, and we thus conceive of it and evaluate it. Here knowing which composition the performance is a performance of is essential. It is arguable that on this conception we must also have (in principle at least) an independent access to the composition, by being able to read its score, for example.1 Being a performance of a particular composition is, on this view, part of the very nature and identity of the performance. There can yet be various different performances of the same composition, and they may be compared and evaluated as such. In light of this essential relationship between the performance and "its" composition (the work whose performance it is) let us call this the "intentionalisticconception of a performance."There is a great difference between these two conceptions, and they imply important differences for the nature of music and of musical composition. I am not committing myself here to any particular view of the ontic nature of a composition — whether it is a class of performances, or a kind (in Nicholas Wolterstorff's sense) or a design (in Roger Scruton's).2 I shall exemplify the pertinence of the above distinction for one case. Many people think that music resides only in performances (some would add, actual and possible... (shrink)

The general topic of this book is the theory of categories, its sources, meaning and development. The inquiry can be seen to proceed on two levels. On one, the history of the theory is traced from its alleged genesis in Aristotle, through its main subsequent stages of Kant and Hegel, up to a kind of consummation in two of its prominent twentieth century adherents, Alfred North White head and Nicolai Hartmann. Special attention has been paid to that aspect of the (...) Hegelian conception of the categorial analysis from which the principle of coherence emerged. On the second, deeper level, however, everything starts with Whitehead's metaphysical system, the central part of which con sists of a fascinating, though highly intricate, web of categorial notions and propositions. The historical perspective becomes a means for untangling that web. I am indebted to a number of people for advice, comment and criticism of various parts of this book. My greatest thanks go to my teachers and colleagues Nathan Rotenstreich, Nathan Spiegel, Yaakov Fleischman, as well as to the late Shmuel Hugo Bergman and Pepita Haezrachi. of this book was published in 1967 by An earlier, Hebrew version the Bialik Institute of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Mr Yehoshua Perel, Mr Arnold Schwartz and to my wife Varda for their cooperation in rendering the extensively revised text of the book into readable English. I also owe great appreciation to Miss Liat Dawe for an accurate and painstaking word-processing of the text. (shrink)

Sadece tarihi ilgilendiriyor gibi görünen felsefenin başlangıcı problemi, şüphesiz tarihsel bir meseledir, ama aynı zamanda felsefenin kendisine de ait bir konudur, çünkü bu probleme ilişkin değerlendirmeler zorunlu olarak felsefenin doğasını açığa vurmaktadır. Felsefeyi Miletli Thales’in başlattığına ve ilk filozof olduğuna dair yerleşik bir gelenek söz konusudur; bununla birlikte, felsefe kendine özgü belirlenimler kazanıp kendini belirlemesini sağlayan belli bir gelişme sürecinin ürünüdür ve bu bakımdan birçok filozofun emeğine gerek duymuştur. Felsefe tarihinin ilk döneminde Grek filozoflar yeni başlangıçlar yapmışlar ve böylelikle felsefenin (...) yeni yönlerinin açığa çıkmasına hizmet etmişlerdir. Bu çalışmada, felsefenin sadece bir kurucusu değil kurucuları olduğunu vurgulamak üzere Thales’ten Aristoteles’e dek Grek filozofların felsefenin oluşumuna sağladıkları katkı irdelenecektir. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Hintergrund Advance Care Planning (ACP) wird auch in Deutschland zunehmend praktiziert. Aus klinisch-ethischer Perspektive bietet ACP eine Möglichkeit, Vorausverfügungen zu konkretisieren und auf diese Weise die Entscheidungsfindung bei fehlender Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit von Patient:innen zu unterstützen. Während es für Gesprächsangebote im Sinne des ACP in Pflegeeinrichtungen und Einrichtungen der Eingliederungshilfe seit 2015 Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten gibt und erste Studien zu Angeboten veröffentlich wurden, fehlt es in Deutschland bisher an publizierten Evaluationsstudien zu ACP-Angeboten im Krankenhaus. Intervention und Methoden Im vorliegenden Beitrag erfolgt die strukturierte (...) Darstellung von ACP als ein Element des klinisch-ethischen Unterstützungsangebotes am Universitätsklinikum Halle (Saale) (UKH). Es erfolgte eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse der schriftlichen Dokumentation von durchgeführten ACP-Gesprächsprozessen für den Zeitraum der Pilotphase von 01/2020 bis 08/2021 (20 Monate). Ergebnisse Im Zeitraum wurden 93 ACP-Gespräche angefragt. Mit 79 Patient:innen konnten 110 Gespräche geführt werden. 46 % der Anfragen kamen von Palliative Care betreuten Patient:innen. Im Durchschnitt dauerten die Beratungen 45 min. Der Gesprächsprozess zur Erstellung einer Patientenverfügung benötigte durchschnittlich 122 min und 2,5 Gespräche. Bei 23 % der Patient:innen endete der ACP-Prozess nach dem Erstgespräch. Die Inhalte der ACP-Prozesse tangierten verschiedene Bereiche anderer Professionen im Krankenhaus, insbesondere die Entscheidungsfindung über aktuelle Diagnostik und Therapie zwischen Ärzt:innen und Patient:innen. Diskussion Die Einführung eines ACP-Angebotes im Krankenhaus zeigt neben einer Vielzahl an Chancen auch Herausforderungen auf, welche es im gemeinsamen Diskurs zu bewältigen gilt. Bei der Einbettung eines ACP-Angebots im Krankenhaus müssen die Besonderheiten der Klinik und insbesondere die Abgrenzung von ACP zu anderen Arbeitsfeldern der Ethikberatung, wie beispielsweise die Ethikfallberatung, bedacht werden. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer ärztliche Umgang mit Opiaten und Sedativa bei Patienten am Lebensende kann ethische Fragen aufwerfen. Entsprechende Entscheidungen blieben bisher in aller Regel der ärztlichen Berufskunst und -pflicht überantwortet. Heute aber gerät dieser Bereich zunehmend auch in den Blickwinkel des Rechts. Ausdruck davon sind Bestrebungen, die indirekte Sterbehilfe, allenfalls auch die terminale Sedierung gesetzlich zu regeln. Ausgehend von einer Ist-Analyse der ärztlichen Praxis sowie von bereits bestehenden Regulierungen untersucht diese Arbeit die Konsequenzen derartiger Bestrebungen. Es zeigt sich, dass der Versuch, die (...) Thematik der indirekten Sterbehilfe für sich allein, also unter Vermeidung einer Regelung der direkt aktiven Sterbehilfe, zu behandeln, zu großen Schwierigkeiten führen würde. Ernüchternd sind aber auch die Erfahrungen aus den Niederlanden, derartige Fragen im Rahmen eines umfassenden Sterbehilfegesetzes anzugehen. Insgesamt ist somit zu befürchten, dass der Versuch einer detaillierten gesetzlichen Regelung dieses Bereiches mehr neue Grauzonen und Unsicherheiten schafft, als er zu beseitigen vermag. (shrink)